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State ex rel. Harry Shapiro Realty & Investment Co. v. Cloyd
On October 21, 1976, the Shapiro Realty and Investment Company
secured ajudgment against Oscar Wood in the Circuit Court for St. Louis
County, Missouri. Shapiro, the judgment creditor, could not collect the judg-
ment. The trial court ordered Wood, the judgment debtor, to appear and
be questioned under oath pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes section
513.380.2 The following day, Wood appeared at the hearing and was inter-
rogated by Shapiro's counsel. Wood stated his name in response to the first
question. He refused, however, to answer any subsequent questions, rely-
ing on both the state and federal privileges against self-incrimination. 3
The judge requested that Wood or his counsel state in general terms a
rational basis on which the answers to the creditor's questions could in-
criminate him.4 Wood's counsel stated that if Wood were living with a female
not his wife, a question about Wood's two house addresses could provide
the last link in a chain of evidence on an adultery or bigamy charge and that
questions about Wood's business activities might implicate him in criminal
income tax violations. 5
Satisfied that this explanation was a rational basis on which Wood's
answers could incriminate him, the judge indicated that Wood's refusal to
1. 615 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc 1981).
2. (1978). This section allows a judgment creditor to examine a judgment
debtor under oath to determine the ability and means of the debtor to satisfy the
judgment.
3. 615 S.W.2d at 42. Language similar to that of the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution is used in the Missouri Constitution, which provides
that "no person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause
.... " MO. CONST. art. I, § 19. Although both the Missouri Constitution and the
United States Constitution "are framed in terms of testimony in 'criminal' cases,
the privilege is available to a witness before any tribunal and in any proceeding in-
cluding civil cases." State ex rel. Pulliam v. Swink, 514 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Mo. En
Banc 1974). In Missouri, it is "well settled" that the privilege has been extended
to judgment debtors in proceedings such as the one in Shapiro. State ex rel. Lee v.
Cavanaugh, 419 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967).
4. 615 S.W.2d at 43. The judge relied on Cantor v. Saitz, 562 S.W.2d 774,
778 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978), in requesting Wood to state a rational basis on which
his answers could incriminate.
5. 615 S.W.2d at 43.
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answer would be sustained, but that the ruling would be withheld to per-
mit Wood to file for a writ of prohibition. 6 Wood filed that petition with the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, which issued a
preliminary writ of prohibition and transferred the case to the Missouri
Supreme Court.7 The supreme court held, under the Missouri Constitu-
tion, "that once a witness claims the privilege... a rebuttable presumption arises
that the witness' answer might tend to incriminate him, a presumption that can be
rebutted by a demonstration by the party seeking the answer that such answer
9 'cannot possibly' have such tendency to incriminate.' "8 The supreme
court then prohibited the judge from proceeding in a manner inconsistent
with this standard.
Under the -unanimous Shapiro decision, a witness in Missouri who in-
vokes the privilege against self-incrimination while under oath no longer bears
a duty to state a rational basis on which his answer conceivably could in-
criminate him. 9 Instead, the questioner must demonstrate that the answer
cannot possibly have such a tendency to incriminate.' 0 The court stated thit
the rational basis approach involved an element of compulsion that was in-
consistent with the purpose of the privilege. 1 The court reasoned that if a
witness is forced to justify the use of the privilege by stating how his answer
could be incriminating, he surrenders the protection intended by the
privilege.1 2 Shapiro's expansion of the constitutional guarantee marked a
change in Missouri law that was both significant and swift. Only seven
months before it decided Shapiro, the Missouri Supreme Court stated in State
v. Wilkinson,' 3 another unanimous opinion, that the requirement that a
6. Id. The preliminary writ ordered the examination stayed pending disposi-
tion of the case on appeal and prohibited the judge from sustaining the witness'
refusal to answer.
7. Id. The appellate court transferred the case to the supreme court pursuant
to Mo. R. CIV. P. 83.02. This rule allows for the transfer of a case to the Missouri
Supreme Court involving a question of general interest or importance, or for the
purpose of re-examining the existing law.
8. 615 S.W.2d at 46 (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898
(1881)).
9. 615 S.W.2d at 45-46.
10. Id. at 46.
11. Id. at 45-46. One of the dangers in allowing the use of questions which
call for incriminating answers is that the witness may be forced to give those answers
which the questioner wants instead of those which are true. Scurlock, Procedural Pro-
tection of the IndividualAgainst the State, 30 K.C. L. REv. 111, 133 (1962). The privilege
is based on "our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilem-
ma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt; ... and our distrust of self-deprecatory
statements." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See generally
E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1957); L. MAYERS, SHALL WE
AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? (1959).
12. 615 S.W.2d at 45. See also Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 462 (1975);
United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1221 (3d Cir. 1978).
13. 606 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. En Banc 1980).
[Vol. 47
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witness describe a rational basis on which his answer could incriminate does
not erode the privilege. 14
The development of Missouri law was based15 on United States v. Burr,1 6
one of the earliest and most significant pronouncements on the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. In Burr, ChiefJustice Marshall
stated that the court, not the witness, should determine whether any direct
answer to the proposed question will furnish evidence against the witness.II
If the court concludes that a direct answer cannot implicate the witness, the
witness may answer without violating the fifth amendment privilege.18
According to Burr, an answer need not be sufficient by itself to convict
the witness of a crifne to invoke the privilege; the answer need only provide
one of the links in the chain of evidence necessary to convict an individual
of a crime.19 Such language particularly applies to judgment debtor hear-
ings where answers to questions about the debtor's income, financial
statements, real property, personal property, tax returns, bank accounts,
and debts may expose a witness to criminal penalties for fraud, tax evasion,
or perjury. 20
Burr implies that neither party must justify or challenge the use of the
privilege. Burr states that if the court finds that a direct answer to the ques-
tion can implicate the witness, the court cannot require additional
14. Id. at 637.
15. See Exparte Gauss, 223 Mo. 277, 284, 122 S.W. 741, 742 (1909); State
ex rel. Howard v. Allison, 431 S.W.2d 233, 237 (Mo. App., Spr. 1968); State ex
rel. Lee v. Cavanaugh, 419 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967); ExparteAr-
vin, 232 Mo. App. 796, 801-02, 112 S.W.2d 113, 116 (K.C. 1937).
16. 25 F. Gas. 38 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692e).
17. Id. at 40.
18. Id. See also Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Private Civil Litigation: A CriticalAnalysis, 39 BROOKLYNL. REV. 121,
136-37 (1972) ("[W]hile the court has the power to compel an answer where the
privilege is improperly invoked, in practice, the chances of its doing so are
remote.").
19. 25 F. Cas. at 40. "It is certainly not only a possible but a probable case
that a witness, by disclosing a single fact, may complete the testimony against
himself, and to every effectual purpose accuse himself as entirely as he would by
stating every circumstance which would be required for his conviction." Id. See also
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975) (protection includes evidence which
individual reasonably believes could be used against him in criminal prosecution);
State ex rel. North v. Kirtley, 327 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Mo. En Banc 1959) (protec-
tion includes answers that may disclose fact that forms necessary and essential link
in chain of testimony which would convict witness of crime). While the protection
extends beyond direct incrimination to information forming a link in the chain of
evidence, the threat of future prosecution still must be more than an imaginary
possibility. Zicarelli v. NewJersey Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478
(1972); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950); Mason v. United States,
244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917).
20. Cantor v. Saitz, 562 S.W.2d 774, 779 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
3
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testimony. 2' Burr does not suggest that a party must assist the court in its
consideration of the claim of privilege.
Several Missouri decisions have interpreted and modified the standards
established by Burr. In 1961, the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in Presta
v. Owsley,22 followed a trend exhibited in federal district and appellate courts
that differed from Burr.23 In Presta, the court adopted a burden of proof ap-
proach, which required the witness to show how the answer might incriminate
him if the question asked appeared to be harmless. 24 Presta directed courts
to be aware of the possibilities of incrimination and to consider the ques-
tion in light of the circumstances. 25 Under Presta, the witness did not have
to prove that his answers would incriminate him, but only that his answers
were likely to be dangerous to him.
26
Procedural safeguards also were established to protect the vitality of the
privilege under the burden of proof approach set forth in Presta. The privilege
had to be asserted with respect to particular questions, 27 and the court had
to state its reason for sustaining or rejecting the witness' claim of privilege.28
21. 25 F. Cas. at 40.
22. 345 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961).
23. Presta differed from Burr by placing a burden on the witness to justify the
use of the privilege. As authority for placing this burden on the witness, the Presta
court cited United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1940), and United
States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1951), aff'd, 203 F.2d 54(D.C. Cir.
1953), rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 190 (1955). It is questionable whether the
Weisman case supports Presta's imposition of a burden of proof on the witness. The
Weisman court stated that when questions are innocent on their face, "it lay upon
the defendant to show that answers to them might incriminate him .... Whether
he had the burden ofproof on that issue we need not decide, for we think in any case he proved
his excuse." 111 F.2d at 261-62 (emphasis added).
24. 345 S.W.2d at 653.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 654. Cf Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1950)
(reasonable inference from circumstances of possibility of incrimination may justify
privilege).
27. General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir.
1973). With regard to the use of the privilege in pre-trial discovery, FED. R. CIV.
P. 33 provides that "[e]ach interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully
.... " This rule is "explicit that blanket refusals to answer based upon the privilege
against self-incrimination are not acceptable." 481 F.2d at 1212. See also Daly v.
United States, 393 F.2d 873, 878 (8th Cir. 1968) (blanket claim of privilege regard-
ing income tax return is not valid).
28. Capital Prods. Corp. v. Hernon, 457 F.2d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 1972). See
also American Cyanamid Co. v. Sharff, 309 F.2d 790, 796 (3d Cir. 1962) (in con-
sidering use of privilege, trial court failed to make finding as to whether it was con-
ceivable that crime had been committed); Daly v. United States, 393 F.2d 873, 878
(8th Cir. 1968) (when trial court overrules witness' objection to question on ground
of self-incrimination, court should explain its reasons in order to give witness op-
portunity to reconsider his response).
[Vol. 47
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The court was required to conduct its inquiry into the validity of the witness'
claim outside the presence of the jury29 and had to focus its inquiry on what
an answer might disclose, instead of on the answer expected by the
questioner.30
In 1967, the Kansas City Court of Appeals modified the Presta approach
in State ex rel. Lee v. Cavanaugh.3 1 Without considering which party had the
burden of proof, the court stated that a valid claim of privilege required a
rational basis on which the answer could incriminate. 32 In 1975, however,
the St. Louis Court of Appeals followed the Presta approach, stating that the
burden of proof rests on the witness if a particular question appears to be
harmless on its face. 33
In 1978, the St. Louis Court of Appeals expressly rejected Presta in Cantor
v. Saitz, 34 stating that it was improper to impose a burden of proof on the
witness by requiring him to state how his answers might be incriminating. 35
The court noted that the privilege extends to explanations of how the answer
could incriminate because the explanation may be as incriminating as the
answer.3 6 Cantor stated that Presta's requirement that the court be aware of
the possibilities of incrimination was not an effective protection because it
assumed a judge is aware of circumstances known only by the witness.3 7
Noting that a check was needed to prevent abuse of the privilege, the court
stated that "the privilege is not eroded by requiring the witness or his counsel
to describe, in general terms, a rational basis on which his answer could con-
ceivably incriminate him.'38 In adopting the rational basis approach, the
29. United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40, 44 (8th Cir. 1976).
30.. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 480
(1972).
31. 419 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967).
32. Id. at 934-35. See also Rogers v. United States, 179 F.2d 559, 562 (10th
Cir. 1950), aff'd, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
33. State exrel. Caloiav. Weinstein, 525 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Mo. App., St. L.
1975).
34. 562 S.W.2d 774 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
35. Id. at 778.
36. Id.
37. Id. The court stated that the "danger of self-incrimination becomes ever
more present with each word of the explanation, and the protection guaranteed is
thereby undermined." Id.
38. Id. The court stated that it considered the rational basis approach "to be
significantly different than imposing a burden of proof, for great weight should be
given the witness' claim." Id. The court cautioned trial judges to be acutely aware
that incrimination may be achieved by obscure and unlikely lines of inquiry. Id.
at 779.
Seven months after Cantor was decided, the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in State
v. Joyner, 571 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978), stated that "the court
cannot require the witness to state his reasons for invoking the privilege . .. ."
AlthoughJoyner and Cantor are inconsistent, later courts, such as Shapiro, recognized
5
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Cantor court recognized that there should be a duty placed on the witness
to justify the privilege, but that the duty should be less burdensome than
that imposed by Presta.39
The Missouri Supreme Court's holding in Shapiro is important in two
respects. First, the new rule maintains that once a witness invokes the
privilege, a rebuttable presumption arises that the claim is valid. 40 This
presumption effectively shifts the burden from the witness to the party seeking
the answer. 41 Second, to rebut this presumption, the questioner must show
that the answer cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate. 42 The court
reasoned that the rational basis approach in Cantor did not provide greater
protection than the burden of proof test in Presta, and that many of the dangers
the Cantor court recognized in placing a burden of proof on the witness are
still present when the rational basis approach is applied. 43 The court found
that the rational basis requirement and the burden of proof approach in-
volved an element of compulsion that was inconsistent with the privilege
because the application of either approach would create the paradox of forc-
ing the witness to surrender the privilege in order to assert it. 4
Although Shapiro involved an interpretation of the Missouri
Constitution, 45 the court relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the fifth amendment in Hoffman v. United States.46 While
both Shapiro and Hoffman47 clearly reject placing a burden of proof on the
witness to justify the claim of privilege, the two cases appear to disagree on
important issues involving the privilege. Shapiro recognizes the presump-
tion of a valid claim when the privilege is asserted.4 8 According to Hoffnan,
however, a claim of privilege does not lead to a presumption of validity. Hoff-
Cantor's imposition of a duty on the witness to state a rational basis to justify the
claim of privilege.
39. Judge Learned Hand has pointed out that a witness may not be compelled
to do more than show that:
the answer is likely to be dangerous to him, else he will be forced to disclose
the very facts which the privilege protects .... The only practicable solu-
tion is to be content with the door's being set a little ajar, and while at times
this no doubt partially destroys the privilege, and at times it permits the
suppression of competent evidence, nothing better is available.
United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1940).
40. 615 S.W.2d at 46.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 45.
44. Id. at 45-46. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
45. 615 S.W.2d at 46. See also notes 59-61 and accompanying text infra.
46. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
47. The Hoffman Court stated that "if a witness, upon interposing his claim
were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required
to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection
which the privilege is designed to guarantee." Id. at 486.
48. 615 S.W.2d at 46.
6
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man states that in order to sustain the privilege, it must be evident from the
implications of the question that an answer to the question or an explana-
tion of why it cannot be answered could incriminate the witness. 49 Satisfac-
tion of this standard is a prerequisite to a valid claim under Hoffman, while
the mere assertion of the right leads to a presumption of validity in Shapiro.
Shapiro borrows the "cannot possibly" language from Hoffman,5 0 but uses
it to describe the standard to be met by the questioner in challenging the
presumption. 51 Hoffinan, however, did not state that the questioner must
prove the impossibility of incrimination. There being no presumption to
rebut, Hoffnan stated that the trial judge must appraise the claim and" 'be
governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case
as by the facts actually in evidence.' "52 Therefore, Shapiro's recognition of
the presumption of a valid claim of privilege was not required by Hoffinan.
Although Shapiro clearly has removed from the witness any burden of
justifying the claim of privilege, federal courts currently are imposing burdens
of varying degrees on a witness invoking the privilege. 53 Moreover, in a case
involving grand jury interrogation decided subsequent to Hoffmnan, the United
States Supreme Court stated that a grand jury can seek ajudicial determina-
tion of the good faith of a witness' claim of privilege, "in which case the
witness must satisfy the presiding judge that the claim of privilege is not
49. 341 U.S. at 486-87. See also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973)
(privilege available to architects summoned to testify before grand jury investigating
charges of conspiracy, bribery, and larceny); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1, 11 (1973) (privilege available to witness requested by grand jury to produce books
and records that would incriminate him); State exrel. Simanek v. Berry, 597 S.W.2d
718, 721-22 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980) (in proceeding for voluntary detention for
alleged mental illness, individual entitled to privilege when issue was whether he
presented likelihood of serious physical harm to himself and others).
50. In Hoffman, the United States Supreme Court held that a claim of privilege
was improperly denied because in the setting in which the claim was made, it was
not " 'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the
case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such
tendency' to incriminate." 341 U.S. at 488 (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth,
75 Va. 892, 898 (1881)) (emphasis in original).
51. 615 S.W.2d at 46.
52. 341 U.S. at 487. In Hoffman, the Supreme Court stated that the trial judge
who ruled on the privilege should have considered that answers to questions regard-
ing business activities and contacts with fugitives could have incriminated the
witness. Id. at 487-88. According to Hoffinan, it is the duty of the trial judge to deter-
mine, by a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, whether the
impossibility of incrimination standard has been satisfied. Id. at 488.
53. E.g., United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1049 (5th Cir.
1976) (witness has burden of establishing entitlement to privilege); United States
v. Carlson, 617 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1980) (burden of showing danger is on
witness ifjudge finds questions to be innocuous); United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d
1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 1980) (incumbent on witness to show that answers might in-
criminate him when questions are harmless on their face).
1982]
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subterfuge." 5 4 This suggests that the rational basis test, rejected in Shapiro's
interpretation of the Missouri Constitution, is accepted by the United States
Supreme Court as a valid approach under the fifth amendment.
The shift in the burden of proof clearly eliminated the paradox created
by surrendering the protection of the privilege in the process of justifying
its use. Requiring the questioner to prove the impossibility of incrimina-
tion, however, leaves the exercise of the privilege to the discretion of the
witness55 and may make it impossible for the questioner to show that the
privilege is being claimed unnecessarily or to obtain information possessed
exclusively by the witness.5 6 In examining the sufficiency of evidence of a
negative, such as the impossibility of incrimination, courts should consider
the practical difficulties of proving a negative and the relationship between
the parties. 57 This approach could temper the harshness of a literal inter-
pretation of Shapiro.5 8
54. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 575 (1976).
55. Sobel, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination "Federalized", 31 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 1, 9 (1964).
56. Kaminsky, supra note 18, at 137. "The practical effect of the incrimina-
tion standard is to make rejection of a claim of privilege difficult, thereby frustrating
the state's ability to acquire information." M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 229
(1980).
57. 31A CJ.S. Evidence § 112(1964). The Missouri Supreme Court has stated
that when one party has the burden of proving a negative, that burden must be
met unless "the evidence on such a matter is peculiarly within the knowledge or
control of the defendant." Kenton v. Massman Constr. Co., 164 S.W.2d 349, 352
(Mo. 1942). See also Potter v. Milbank Mfg. Co., 489 S.W.2d 197, 203 (Mo. 1972)
(no burden on employee to prove true cause of his termination because true reason
was peculiarly within knowledge of employer). It would seem that such a rule would
not apply to the questioner bearing the burden of showing the impossibility of in-
crimination, because such evidence of incrimination almost always would be
peculiarly within t he knowledge of the witness. It is doubtful that the Missouri
Supreme Court intended the Shapiro rule to be swallowed up by the Kenton exception.
58. If literally applied, the Shapiro approach would result in the recognition
of the privilege nearly every time it is invoked. An argument could be made that
Shapiro has changed the privilege against self-incrimination into a privilege not to
answer questions in court. Such a modification probably would not be viewed
favorably by the United States Supreme Court, which has stated that with respect
to grand jury proceedings, "the Fifth Amendment does not confer an absolute right
to decline to respond .... [T]he privilege does not negate the duty to testify, but
simply conditions that duty." United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572
(1976). Federal statutes conferring immunity in federal judicial proceedings indicate
that the privilege is not absolute. If immunity is granted, "the witness can then
be compelled to answer, on pain of contempt, even though the testimony would
implicate the witness in criminal activity." Id. at 575.
One of the positive results of Shapiro is the establishment of a fairly definitive
rule in an unsettled area of law. Shapiro, however, has only narrowed the range of
possible solutions. Clearly, a literal interpretation of Shapiro would result in sus-
574 [Vol. 47
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The Shapiro court's expansion of the Missouri Constitution's privilege
against self-incrimination beyond the requirements of the fifth amendment
does not in itself violate the supremacy clause because a state court is "always
free to grant individuals more rights than those guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion so long as it does so on the basis of state law." ,59 Shapiro arguably may
conflict with the Federal Constitution, however, if Shapiro's broad interpreta-
tion of the privilege impairs the right to compulsory process under the sixth
amendment. Such an argument may succeed if the application of the Shapiro
approach results in fraudulent use of the privilege against self-incrimination,
because invalid claims of privilege do not necessarily take precedence over
the right to compulsory process. 60 Although such a challenge may be remote,
it should be considered in light of the Burger Court's gradual reversal of
the Warren Court's expansion of the scope of the privilege. 61
taining the privilege nearly every time it is invoked. Consideration of several fac-
tors not expressly contained in the language of Shapiro could moderate the effect
of this rule. Trial courts may be inclined to consider the problems of proving a
negative since the issue to be demonstrated lies peculiarly within the knowledge
of the witness. Whether the trial courts will require formal proof of the impossibility
of incrimination also will affect the ability of a questioner to satisfy the standard.
Courts also might reduce the burden by requiring the questioner to show the im-
possibility of incrimination only as it relates to the particular individual being in-
terrogated and by limiting the standard to one of "reasonable" impossibility.
Although the Shapiro approach is written in straightforward language, the ultimate
effect of the case will depend on its interpretation and application by the Missouri
courts.
59. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21
(1978). For a discussion of the power of state courts, see Brennan, State Constitu-
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 490 (1977).
60. Royal v. Maryland, 529 F.2d 1280, 1283 (4th Cir. 1976) (defendant would
be denied his sixth amendment right to compulsory process if trial court erroneously
sustains witness' invocation of privilege). The Federal Constitution provides that
in "all criminal prosecutions... the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. ... " U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. This right guarantees more than a right to compulsory attendance of the witness
at trial; it includes the right to have the testimony of that witness heard. 529 F.2d
at 1283. See also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (right to present
defense is right to compel attendance of witnesses and right to offer their testimony).
It would appear that Shapiro could be subject to challenge as an impairment of
the sixth amendment in a situation where the defendant in a criminal case calls an
important witness who invokes the privilege, with the defendant being unable to
demonstrate that his question could not possibly incriminate the witness. If the
defendant could show that the application of the Shapiro standard results in an im-
permissible burden on the right to compulsory process, such a challenge may be
successful.
61. Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's
Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 384-86 (1977). There is support for a more nar-
row view of the privilege. According to Justice Cardozo, "Justice. .. would not
perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry." Palko
9
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The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Shapiro marks a significant
change in the interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination pro-
vided in the Missouri Constitution. The recognition of a presumption of
validity when the claim is made is a significant departure from past law62
that imposed on the witness a burden of proof or a duty to explain a rational
basis. Shapiro further broadens the scope of the privilege by stating that the
presumption can be rebutted by the questioner, effectively shifting the burden
from the witness to the party seeking the answer. Shapiro also expands the
privilege by requiring the question1er to demonstrate the impossibility of in-
crimination in order to rebut the presumption-a difficult standard to satisfy,
involving proof of a negative.
Although the Missouri Supreme Court's reliance on Hoffmnan was ques-
tionable, the Shapiro decision satisfies several desirable goals. It liberally con-
strues the privilege in favor of the right the privilege was intended to secure. 63
The elimination of the rational basis approach by the Missouri Supreme
Court means that the witness no longer will face the paradox of having to
justify the use of the privilege by surrendering the protection afforded by
it. Shapiro also provides Missouri courts with a straightforward rule in an
area of law that had been marked by conflicting and uncertain guidelines.
The Missouri Supreme Court in Shapiro has made a substantial change
that is rationally based, modifying a rule of law that involved competing
interests. 64 The future of Shapiro may depend on the ability ofjudges to ad-
minister the rule fairly and effectively. 65 If the application of this approach
results in the proper recognition of the interests of witnesses without unfairly
jeopardizing the rights of other parties to a fair trial, Shapiro could be a land-
mark interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
ROGER C. GEARY
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). For a general discussion of the policy
behind the privilege, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughten rev.
1961).
62. See notes 13, 22, 35 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
63. See generally Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
64. Cf California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971) ("Tension between the
State's demand for disclosures and the protection of the right against self-
incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions. Inevitably these must be
resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual
claim to constitutional protections on the other; neither interest can be treated
lightly.").
65. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
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